Selling information in extensive form games by Perea, Andrés & Swinkels, Jeroen
Working Paper 99-44 
Economics Series 18 
June 1999 
Departamento de Economia 
U niversidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Calle Madrid, 126 
28903 Getafe (Spain) 
Fax (3491) 624-98-75 
SELLING INFORMATION IN EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES * 
Andres Perea and Jeroen Swinkels ** 
Abstract --------------------------------
We consider a situation in wich decision makers in an extensive form game can buy additional 
information from an information seller before reaching their decisions. Prices for information 
are selected by the seller. We analyze a variety of scenarios for the price setting process by the 
seller: the case in which prices are chosen before the game starts (ex-ante pricing), the case in 
which prices are chosen during the game (ex-post pricing) and the situation in which the seller 
can pit buyers against each other in determining what information is to be sold. Within the 
context of ex-ante pricing, we also consider the situation in which the precise information 
offered to the decision makers is not exogenously given but is selected by the seller. 
Keywords: Extensive form games, information. 
JEL classification: C72, C73, D82 
** Perea, Departamento de Econornia, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, calle Madrid 126, 
28903 Getafe - Madrid, Spain. E.mail: perea@eco.uc3m.es 
Swinkels, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Lous, St. Louis, MO, 
USA. E. mail: swinkels@mail.olin.wustl.edu 
* We thank an anonymous referee for useful comments on a previous version. 
1. Introduction 
The problem of reaching decisions under uncertainty occurs in many economic 
situations. In some of these situations, there is an 'outsider' who has access to 
relevant information which can be sold to the decision makers. For instance, a 
consultant may have access to data about outputs in a duopoly. An expert may 
know more about quality than the players in a signaling game l whereas a spy may 
have information about the moves in a strategic interaction between two firms or 
countries. 
A number of papers deal with the role of an information seller in strategic in-
teractions. Sakai (1985) considers a duopoly in which two firms face uncertainty 
both about their own marginal costs and the marginal costs of their opponent. 
Both firms can obtain information about these uncertain facts from a market 
research agency. Sakai investigates how the additional information provided by 
the agency influences the behavior of the firms. In Admati and Pfleiderer (1986), 
traders on a speculative market can buy private information about the payoff of a 
risky asset from a monopolistic information seller. Kamien et al. (1990) explores 
the situation in which an outsider can provide the players of an extensive form 
game with information about the play of the game. Other relevant papers include 
Allen (1986), Green (1981), Levine and Ponssard (1977) and Milne and Shefrin 
(1987). 
In nearly all these settings, the information holder is non-strategic: he is present 
to provide decision makers with additional information but does not have strategic 
incentives for his behavior. 2 The price of information is usually assumed to be 
exogenously given. However, it seems relevant in most of the examples above 
to consider the incentives of the information seller as well. In this paper, we 
explore several game theoretic models for the situation in which decision makers 
can buy additional information from a monopolistic information seller. In all 
of these models the information seller is assumed to be a strategic actor. As a 
consequence, the prices for information chosen by the seller are no longer given 
but arise from a strategic interaction between the decision makers and the seller. 
The difference between the models lies primarily in the way prices are chosen by 
the seller. Questions that we want to consider are what prices should be chosen 
by the seller for the information he offers, the income the seller can expect from 
selling information, and how the outcome is affected by the price setting process. 
IFor a model of agents who can sell information about quality see Lizzeri (1998). 
2Lizzeri (1998) is an exception. Lizzeri considers a model in which a seller of an object has 
private information about the quality. A buyer is interested in the purchase of the object. Lizzeri 
adds to this model a "certification intermediary" who can test the good' and learn its quality. 
The intermediary is a profit maximizing monopolist. In Lizzeri's model, the intermediary moves 
first, and sets a price for his services and a disclosure rule specifying what information will be 
revealed to the buyer. The model is thus an example of what we term "ex ante pricing with 
endogenous signal mechanisms." Lizzeri shows that the intermediary may release less than full 
information, and that he is able to extract much of the surplus generated by the market. 
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The situation is modeled as follows. Starting from a finite extensive form game, 
the base game, an information seller is added who has access to some information 
about the play of the game. This might be information about a choice by nature 
or about the past moves of one or more of the players. In Sections 2 through 5 
we assume, for simplicity, that the seller is perfectly informed about all events 
that take place in the game. Section 6 describes how our model can be extended 
to the case of a partially informed seller. 
The information seller has the ability to sell this information to the players of 
the base game, who are hence called buyers. Formally, the seller offers a finite 
collection of signal mechanisms at each information set. A signal mechanism is a 
device which assigns to every node of the information set a probability distribution 
over some finite set of signals. For each signal mechanism the seller chooses a price. 
The buyer who controls this information set observes the menu of mechanisms 
and prices and decides which mechanism to buy. To give the buyer the outside 
option not to buy any information at all, it is assumed that the trivial mechanism 
(revealing no extra information) is always available for free at every information 
set. After buying a mechanism, the buyer is provided with the signal produced 
by this mechanism and then chooses an action. The payoff for the seller is his 
expected income from selling information. The payoff for a buyer is the difference 
between the expected payoff in the base game and the expected amount paid for 
information. The game obtained in this way is called the extended game. 
To formalize the assumption that both seller and buyers act rationally we assume 
that the seller and buyers play a sequential equilibrium in the extended game. 
The highest payoff that can be achieved by the seller in a sequential equilibrium 
of the extended game is called the information value and is used as a measure 
for the seller's power. 
There are several dimensions which have not yet been specified, and along which 
a sensible model of information selling might vary, depending on the underlying 
economic situation. First, when and how is the price of a signal mechanism set - at 
the beginning of the game or when the corresponding information set is reached? 
Is the price a matter between the seller and the buyer at that information set, 
or can other buyers be involved? Who else knows the price that is set for a 
particular mechanism? Finally, what is the information seller able to sell: can 
he, for example, sell a garbling of his information? 
Rather than attempt to analyze all combinations of these assumptions, we content 
ourselves with an illustrative tour of the various settings. We begin by considering 
a world in which pricing is a matter solely between the seller and the buyer at a 
given information set. The scenarios differ in terms of the timing of price setting, 
and how much latitude the seller has in determining what is to be sold. 
With ex-ante pricing, the seller chooses prices at the beginning of the game, and 
these prices are known to everyone before the game begins. Ex-ante pricing thus 
involves a degree of commitment power on the part of the seller, in the sense that 
he can commit to prices at the beginning of the game that he may want to change 
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once the game is under way. Such commitment might make sense if, for example, 
the base game occurs repeatedly with different information buyers, and the same 
seller (consider for example, a credit reporting agency). In the basic version of 
ex-ante pricing, the set of mechanisms available at each information set is fixed 
exogenously, and prices can only be conditioned on the a-priori information of 
the player to whom the information is being sold (the seller may know more, 
including what he sold to other players, observed at earlier information sets, or 
even what the outcome of the signals at the current information set are). As we 
shall see, this is a real restriction. However, it has the advantage that both the 
seller and buyer know what the price should be at the time of the transaction. 
Within this setting, we show existence of sequential equilibria, something which 
is not obvious since prices come from a continuum. 
We show by example that the seller would sometimes like to condition his pricing 
at an information set on information not visible to the buyer, such as the node 
reached, or what was sold to another player at an earlier information set. This 
may be desirable even though by doing so, the seller is giving away part of his in-
formation for free through the price setting process. We also show that the seller 
may wish to commit to a mechanism in which the signal is garbled. Effectively, 
the seller sometimes wants to sell an amount of information which is intermedi-
ate between two of the exogenously given signal mechanisms. To capture these 
possibilities, we extend our model to a very general form of ex-ante pricing in 
which the seller can endogenously select the set of mechanisms he wants to offer 
at each information set. In this setting, before the base game begins, the seller 
can design and offer for sale any set of maps from his information to signals, and 
can let the pricing and availability of these mechanisms depend (in potentially 
stochastic fashion) on which node has been reached. We show that the seller 
can restrict himself to offering at every information set exactly one non-trivial 
mechanism, the signals of which can be interpreted as recommending actions to 
the buyer. The result thus has a flavor similar to revelation principle arguments 
(see Myerson (1979) and Dasgupta et al. (1979)).3 Using this result, we are able 
to show that sequential equilibria with endogenous mechanism selection always 
exist. Of course, this setting requires a larger degree of commitment on the part 
of the seller since buyers have to be willing to trust that the seller is charging the 
price he said he would as a function of the information that is unobservable to the 
buyer, and similarly, the buyers have to believe in the integrity of the garbling 
process even though the seller might gain by misrepresenting information. 
3Because we are working in the extensive form, the result also has a connection to Forges 
(1986), which studies the effect of introducing communication into games, including the possi-
bility of randomization devices which give correlated but private signals to the various players. 
Our focus differs from Forges in considering the ability of the seller to add information directly 
about the play of the game so far at particular decision points, and in explicitly thinking about 
the incentives of an information seller. It is however the case that one source of the seller's 
profits in our setting (especially when we turn to unconstrained mechanisms in the penultimate 
section) can be through providing the sort of signal that Forge discusses. 
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Under ex-ante pricing, the seller is able to commit to a set of prices (or mecha-
nisms) before the base game starts. In some settings, this does not seem plausible. 
So, we turn to a model of ex-post pricing. In this model, the price of each mech-
anism is chosen at the moment of sale. This price is known only to the seller 
and buyer at that information set. So, ex-post pricing involves a very minimal 
degree of commitment on the part of the seller. We show two examples in which 
the lowered commitment power relative to ex-ante pricing hurts the information 
seller. We also argue that the extra flexibility of ex-post pricing compared to 
the basic version of ex-ante pricing can imply a revenue advantage for ex-post 
pricing. So, the ranking between the basic form of ex-ante pricing and ex-post 
pricing is ambiguous. However, because ex-ante pricing with endogenous selec-
tion of signal mechanisms incorporates similar flexibility, the information value 
with endogenous selection of mechanisms is always at least as great as that with 
ex-post pricing. 
Under ex-post pricing the seller might be tempted to reveal part of what he knows 
at an information set in order to raise the buyer's willingness to pay for the rest. 
We show an example in which this occurs, and where the seller's inability to 
commit not to do this lowers his profits as viewed from the beginning of the 
game. 
In the settings discussed so far, information transactions at an information set h 
are purely between the seller and the player who controls h. However, sometimes 
the most valuable thing for a seller to do with information at h is to extract 
money from some player who wants the seller not to reveal information at h. Or, 
a buyer might wish to publicly precommit to buying (or not buying) information 
at a particular information set so as to either discourage or encourage other 
players from playing so that the information set is reached. Under unconstrained 
pricing, we generalize ex-ante pricing by assuming that the seller can set up 
arbitrarily complicated schemes in which buyers' actions before the play of the 
base game interact to determine the prices of the mechanisms offered. This may 
thus seem analytically intractable. However, we exhibit a simple mechanism that 
can achieve as much for the seller as any unconstrained setup. Using this, we 
provide a characterization of the information value with unconstrained pricing, 
and show that the information value in this case is at least as high as in the basic 
ex-ante case. 
In all models described above, we assume that the seller is perfectly informed 
about all events that take place in the base game, as well as in the extended 
game. Since this assumption may not be completely realistic in some situations 
we take a short look at the case of a partially informed seller at the end of this 
paper. Each of the models can be extended immediately to this situation and 
similar results would be obtained. A typical phenomenon which arises with an 
incompletely informed seller is the fact that the buyers' purchase behavior serves 
as a signaling device to the seller from which he can extract information about 
the true state of the world. For instance, the seller may learn about a buyer's 
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type by looking carefully at his purchase behavior in the past. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we layout the standard model. 
The cases of ex-ante and ex-post pricing are analyzed in Sections 3 and 4, re-
spectively. Section 5 considers the case of unconstrained pricing. We conclude by 
briefly discussing the case of a partially informed seller in Section 6. 
2. Model 
We begin with the players in a finite extensive form game (called the base game) 
who, whenever they find themselves at one of their information sets, can purchase 
a signal mechanism from a finite set of mechanisms. The signal mechanisms are 
offered by a monopolistic information seller who sets prices for the mechanisms. 
We assume that the seller is always perfect informed about the node being reached 
in the base game. A signal mechanism at an information set h is a function 
assigning to every node x E h some randomization over a finite set of signals 
(in some cases, we also allow the randomization to depend on other things the 
seller knows). Examples include the perfect mechanism, in which each node maps 
to a distinct signal, the trivial mechanism, in which all nodes map to the same 
signal, and mechanisms which provide a noisy signal of the node reached. After 
buying a mechanism, the player observes the signal produced by the mechanism 
and chooses an action. This gives rise to a new game, called the extended game, 
which is played by the seller and the players of the original extensive form game, 
who from now on will be called buyers. 
In order to specify the rules of the extended game, we make the following as-
sumptions: 
1. The purchase of a mechanism by one buyer is not observed by other buyers. 
2. The signal produced by a mechanism is only observed by the buyer who 
bought the mechanism. 
3. The trivial mechanism is offered at every information set at price zero. In 
this way, a buyer can always choose not to buy any information at alL 
The payoff for the seller in the extended game is the expected income from selling 
signal mechanisms. The payoff for a buyer is his expected payoff in the base game 
minus the expected amount paid for signal mechanisms. 
We assume that both seller and buyers act rationally. This is formalized by 
requiring that seller and buyers play a sequential equilibrium of the extended 
game. In general, there is no unique sequential equilibrium payoff for the seller, 
which makes it difficult to predict the outcome for the seller. One could think 
of several ways to overcome this problem, for instance by concentrating on the 
highest possible payoff for the seller in a sequential equilibrium, or the lowest 
possible payoff, or the expected income with respect to some probability measure 
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on the set of sequential equilibria. We think, however, that the first option 
provides a reasonable measure for the strength of the seller in the extended game. 
The highest payoff that can be obtained by the seller in a sequential equilibrium 
of the extended game is called the information value. 
3. Ex-ante Pricing 
Under ex-ante pricing, the seller chooses his pricing strategy before the buyers 
start playing the base game. This pricing strategy is common knowledge among 
the buyers before the base game starts. Hence, each pricing strategy by the 
information seller defines a subgame in which at each information set, the buyer 
who controls that information set chooses what mechanism to purchase and what 
action to take as a function of the signal received. 
We examine two cases which we think of defining the extreme points of a large 
set of possible models of ex-ante pricing. We call these basic ex-ante pricing and 
ex-ante pricing with endogenous signal mechanisms. 
3.1. Basic ex-ante pricing 
Under basic ex-ante pricing, the set of mechanisms available for sale is exoge-
nously specified and assumed to be finite. Further, the price of a mechanism 
can depend only on the information available to the buyer at the moment the 
information set in question is reached. The price may, for instance, depend on 
previous information purchases by the same buyer, but it cannot depend on un-
observed information sales to other buyers, or on what else the seller knows at 
the moment of purchase. Moreover, the seller cannot construct garblings of his 
basic information. This seems to us a reasonable model of a setting in which the 
seller has the power to commit to posted prices, but does not have the power to 
commit to more elaborate schemes (we consider the implications of such power 
later). An example here would be a credit reporting agency which has the ability 
to commit to a price for a report about a company but can not change those 
prices to reflect either who else has bought information about the same company 
or whether the report contains damaging information about that company. 
Formally, the extended game is defined as follows. At every information set h 
of the base game controlled by buyer i, let ih be the vector containing (a) the 
profile of mechanisms bought by i at previous information sets and (b) the profile 
of signals observed by him at previous information sets. The vector ih is called 
the information state and h denotes the set of possible information states for 
buyer i at h. A pure strategy p for the seller is to assign to every information set 
h and each information state ih E h a price for each of the mechanisms offered 
at h.4 In the remainder of this section, p will simply be called a price vector. 
4It is sufficient to concentrate on pure strategies for the seller since the prices announced by 
the seller are observed by all buyers before the base game starts. Therefore, randomizing over 
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A behavior strategy for buyer i is to assign to each triple (p, h, i h ) where h is 
controlled by i (a) a randomization over the mechanisms that can be bought at 
hand (b) a function assigning to each possible signal that can be observed at h a 
randomization over actions available at h. Note that in the model as described, 
the seller makes his decisions before the base game starts whereas the buyers 
reach their decisions at the time the corresponding information set in the base 
game is reached. 
It remains to specify the belief systems for the buyers. Suppose that buyer i finds 
himself at information set h with information state ih and has observed price 
vector p at the beginning of the game. Buyer i does not know at which node in 
h he is nor does he know which mechanisms have been bought by other buyers 
at previous information sets and the signals that have been observed by them. 
The states of the world among which buyer i can not distinguish are therefore 
triples (x, m, s) where x is a node in h, m is a vector of mechanisms bought 
by other buyers at previous information sets and s is a corresponding vector of 
signals observed by these buyers. Let this set of states by denoted by eh. A belief 
system for buyer i is to specify for each triple (p, h, ih), where h is controlled by 
i, some randomization over eh. 
Existence of sequential equilibria with basic ex-ante pricing 
Under all the situations we consider in this paper, the seller can choose from a 
continuum of prices (and in some cases from continua on other dimensions as 
well). Hence, the extended game is not a finite extensive form game and so the 
existence of sequential equilibria in the extended game is not obvious. We show 
that in the case of basic ex-ante pricing, a sequential equilibrium can always be 
found. The key to this construction is that each choice by the seller creates a 
finite extensive form subgame, where the equilibrium set of the sub game varies 
upper hemi continuously in the seller's choice. 
Theorem 3.1. Every extended game with basic ex-ante pricing has a sequential 
equilibrium. 
Proof. At the beginning of the extended game, the seller chooses a price vector 
p which then becomes common knowledge. By rep) we denote the subgame 
which starts when the buyers observe p. In the subgame rep) the seller has no 
longer an active role since he made all his choices at the beginning. Whenever a 
buyer is called upon to play at an information set h in rep), the set h of possible 
information states is finite. Since there are only finitely many mechanisms, signals 
and actions at each information set, the subgame rep) is a finite extensive form 
game and therefore has a sequential equilibrium. 
prices has no effect in the extended game. 
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Let f5 be a price high enough to ensure that no buyer is prepared to pay more 
than f5 for any signal mechanism. (Recall that the trivial mechanism is always 
available at price zero.) Let P be the set of price vectors in which all prices are 
at most f5 + L For every PEP, the set SEep) of sequential equilibria in r(p) is 
a non-empty, compact set. Since the seller's payoff depends continuously on the 
assessment in rep), there is thus a sequential equilibrium ((JP,j3P) E SEep) which 
induces the highest payoff for the seller among all sequential equilibria in SEep). 
Here, (JP denotes the behavior strategy profile and j3P the belief system of the 
players in r(p). 
Let Us = SUPpEP us((JP,j3P), where us(aP,j3P) is the payoff for the seller induced 
by ((JP, f3P). Choose a sequence (pk) kEN in P such that Us = limk->oo Us (apk , j3pk). 
Since P is a compact set, we may assume without loss of generality that pk 
converges to some p* E P. The space of assessments in the subgame rep) is the 
same compact set for every p. Hence, we may assume without loss of generality 
that (apk , f3Pk) converges to some assessment (a*, {3*). It is easily checked that 
SE (.) is upper hemi continuous. Hence ((J*, 13*) is a sequential equilibrium in 
r(p*). 
Consider the assessment of the extended game in which the seller chooses the 
price vector p*, the buyers act according to (a*, {3*) after observing that p* has 
been chosen and play an arbitrary sequential equilibrium in rep) after any other 
price vector p i= p*. We show that this is a sequential equilibrium of the extended 
game. 
By construction, the seller's payoff is the highest payoff that can be achieved by 
the seller in any sequential equilibrium of any subgame rep) with pEP. Since 
no buyer is willing to pay more than f5 for information, it follows that it is the 
highest payoff that can be achieved by the seller in any sequential equilibrium of 
any possible subgame rep). In particular, a sequential equilibrium of rep) clearly 
remains an equilibrium if every element of p that is greater than f5 + 1 is replaced 
by f5 + 1. Therefore, the seller can never improve his payoff by choosing another 
price vector, which implies that we have a sequential equilibrium of the extended 
game. 0 
Since the exhibited equilibrium gives the seller at least as high a payoff as in any 
other sequential equilibrium, it follows that it supports the information value. 
Examples 
We next turn to two examples showing that under ex-ante pricing, the seller would 
benefit from a richer set of alternatives. The first example shows that the seller 
may want to commit to prices in which the price at an information set depends 
on information available to the seller but not to the buyer. In particular, we show 
an example in which the seller may want to condition the price of a mechanism 
on the node reached at the corresponding information set. 
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Example 3.1. Desirability of conditioning price on what the seller knows. 
Consider the following game in which the seller offers trivial and perfect informa-
tion to both player 1 and 2. 
1 
2,0 
0,0 
0.2 
0,0 
2,0 
2,0 2 0,8 
.25 0,0 
0,0 4,0 
4,8 
Figure 1 
In a world in which the seller can only condition the prices on what the buyer 
knows, the seller can at most get 2. This payoff is achieved in the sequential 
equilibrium in which the seller charges 100 to player 1 (therefore forcing player 1 
not to buy information), player 1 goes down, the seller charges 4 to player 2 and 
player 2 buys the perfect mechanism with probability one. It can be verified that 
it is always optimal for the seller not to sell information to player 1. Since player 
2 is at most willing to pay 4 for information, the seller can not expect more than 
2 in any sequential equilibrium. 
However, if the seller can make the price dependent on the node then he can obtain 
2~ in a sequential equilibrium. This can be achieved as follows. The seller charges 
price 1 to player 1 if one of his two upper nodes is reached and charges price 100 
otherwise. Player 1 buys after observing price 1 and does not buy otherwise. The 
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seller charges price 4 to player 2 who buys the perfect mechanism. Hence, this 
example illustrates that conditioning the price on what the seller knows but the 
buyer does not can be beneficial for the seller. 
In our next example, it is desirable for the seller to offer a garbling of his infor-
mation. 
Example 3.2. Desirability of garbling. 
1 
0.5 
N 
0.5 
10,0 
0,0 
5,0 
0.5 
N 
0.5 
2 
Figure 2 
0,100 
0,0 
0,0 
0,100 
Assume that the seller has available the perfect and trivial mechanisms at each 
information set. When player 1 buys perfect information, he chooses up at his 
upper node. When he buys trivial information, he again chooses up. Hence, 
player 2 is never reached. So the best the seller can do is sell perfect information 
to player 1 at price 3. However, assume the seller can commit to the following 
mechanism: If the upper node is reached, then ~ the time I will send you signal 
"A", and! the time I will send you signal "B." If the lower node is reached, I 
will send you "B". I will sell you this for free. Then, when "B" is received, player 
1 updates to probability ~ that he is at his lower node, and so down is a best 
response. The information seller can then sell player 2 perfect information ! of 
the time at price 50, gaining more than 3. 
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So, if the seller is able to commit to mechanisms more complicated than under 
basic ex-ante pricing, there is clearly room for him to improve his revenue. There 
are clearly a plethora of different models which give the seller varying degrees 
of ability to condition price on hidden information or sell randomizations of his 
signals. Rather than examine a large number of intermediate models, we turn 
now to a model of ex-ante pricing in which the seller is given total freedom in 
this regard. 
3.2. Ex-ante pricing with endogenous signal mechanisms 
With basic ex-ante pricing we assumed that the set of signal mechanisms offered 
by the seller at each information set is exogenously given. In this section we ana-
lyze the situation where the seller can choose the set of mechanisms he wants to 
offer. The seller is assumed to be capable of offering any possible signal mecha-
nism. That is, he can construct and offer for sale any garbling of his information. 
For simplicity, we consider the case in which the seller knows exactly which node 
is reached for each information set of the base game. At each information set 
the seller selects a randomization over a finite number of menus, where a menu 
consists of a finite set of mechanisms and corresponding prices. We assume that 
the randomization can be made dependent on everything the seller knows at that 
point in time, including the node that has been reached. As such, the actual 
menu offered may serve as a signal to the buyer about which node he is at. We 
assume that the trivial mechanism is available in every menu and is always offered 
for free. All the choices by the seller (about the composition of each menu and 
the probability with which each menu is offered as a function of the seller's infor-
mation) are made before the actual game starts and are observed by all buyers. 
The outcome of the randomization over which menu to offer is not: the actual 
menu chosen by the seller is only observed by the buyer at h and not by the other 
buyers. This situation can therefore be seen as an extension of the basic ex-ante 
case where prices can be made dependent on the seller's information. We term 
this case ex-ante pricing with endogenous signal mechanisms, or, more briefly, the 
endogenous case. 
We assume that the seller at each point of the game knows the node that has 
been reached and the outcomes of all information transactions at all information 
sets previously reached. A pure strategy r for the seller is a function assigning 
to each information set a randomization over a finite set of menu's, where the 
randomization is allowed to depend on the node and the sequence of information 
transactions that have occured until that moment. Here, each menu consists of 
a finite number of mechanisms and corresponding prices. 
At every information set h controlled by buyer i let ih be the information state 
for player i containing ( a) the menus offered by the seller (as the outcome of some 
randomization) at i's previous information sets, (b) mechanisms bought by i in 
the past and (c) signals observed by i in the past. The set of information states 
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for buyer i at h is denoted by h. 
Let r be the seller's strategy and M the actual menu chosen at h. A behavior 
strategy for a buyer assigns to each profile (r, h, ih, M) where h is controlled 
by i (a) a randomization over the mechanisms that can be bought at M and 
(b) a function assigning to each possible signal that can be observed at M a 
randomization over actions available at h. 
At every information set h, let eh be the set of possible states of the world among 
which the buyer at h can not distinguish. The space eh consists of quadruples 
(x, if, rn, s) where x is a node in h, if is a vector of menus offered to other buyers 
at previous information sets, rn is a corresponding vector of mechanisms bought 
by these buyers at these information sets and s is a vector of signals observed 
by them at these information sets. A belief system for buyer i assigns to every 
profile (r, h, ih, M), where h is controlled by i, some randomization over eh. 
Since the seller can always do whatever he did before under basic ex-ante pricing, 
and since the seller in both cases chooses before the base game begins, it is clear 
that ex-ante pricing with endogenous selection of signal mechanisms always yields 
a higher information value than the base version of ex-ante pricing. 
At first sight, a full analysis of this setting seems quite intractable. However, we 
show that the seller can restrict himself to a so-called simple strategy in which 
at every node of a given information set he offers the same single menu with 
probability one. This menu consists of only one non-trivial mechanism, which 
can be interpreted as recommending actions to the buyer. 
Definition 3.2. Say that a seller's strategy is simple if for each h, ih, there is a 
single menu Mh,ih which the seller offers with probability 1, where Mh,ih consists 
of the trivial mechanism (at price 0) plus at most one non-trivial signal mecha-
nism, and where the non-trivial mechanism has signal space equal to the set of 
actions available at h. 
Note that in a simple strategy, the set of information states ih at h is just equal 
to a sequence stating whether or not t/he corresponding buyer has bought non-
trivial information at previous information sets and, if so, which actions have 
been recommended. 
Let r be the strategy chosen by the seller before the actual game starts. For every 
r, the buyers enter a subgame r( r) in which the seller is no longer a strategic 
actor since all his actions are already captured by r. Since the subgame r(r) is 
finite it contains a sequential equilibrium of the game between the buyers. 
Lemma 3.3. Let «(J', (3) be a sequential equilibrium of the buyers in some sub-
game r(r) of the endogenous case. Then, there is a simple strategy r and a 
sequential equilibrium (0-,/3) in r(r) giving the same payoff for the seller and 
buyers, and the same distribution over terminal nodes of the base game as ((J', {3) 
in r(r). 
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Proof. Consider the sub game induced by r, and the associated sequential equi-
librium of the subgame. We proceed in two steps. First, create an automaton 
for each h, ih belonging to i which takes care of viewing the menu offered, de-
ciding on an information purchase, observing the signal, and randomizing over 
actions according to the specified equilibrium. The automaton does not choose 
actions for the base game. Rather, at each point where i would choose an action 
from the base game, i's automaton recommends an action to player i, where the 
recommendation is observed only by player i. The automaton is thus a signal 
mechanism with signal space equal to the action space at h. The signal produced 
is equal to the randomization over actions that the buyer would have chosen at 
the same point in time in ((J, (3). Note that this randomization over actions al-
ready includes the randomization over menu's and the buyer's purchase behavior 
at h,ih in ((J,(3). 
Secondly, we construct a simple strategy for the seller in which at each h, ih the 
seller offers exactly one menu containing the trivial mechanism and the automa-
ton. We claim that it is a sequential equilibrium of the induced game for players 
to always purchase the automaton and follow the recommendations given. 
To see that, once one has the automaton purchased, it is optimal to follow the 
recommended actions, note first that from the point of view of other players, 
player i's behavior has not changed. And, since i's information in the new game 
is a garbling of his information in the old, it is clear that if i has a profitable 
deviation from a recommended action at some information set, then there was 
also a profitable deviation under the richer original information structure. 
In the game created, at the point where h belonging to player i is first reached, 
i's information ih consists of whether or not the automaton has been purchased 
at his previous information sets and a sequence of recommendations at these in-
formation sets. Let the price in r of the automaton at h, ih be the expected price 
that i pays in the original sequential equilibrium at the same point in time. Since 
we started with a sequential equilibrium of the subgame generated by r, it is op-
timal for all players to purchase the automaton at each h, ih at this price. Hence, 
we have a simple strategy r and a sequential equilibrium (0-, /3) in fer) which does 
not change the expected payoff to the information seller, nor the distribution over 
the terminal nodes of the base game. 0 
A key implication of the lemma is that it can be used to show existence of a 
sequential equilibria. 
Theorem 3.4. The extended game of the endogenous case always has a sequen-
tial equilibrium. 
Proof. After the strategy r has been chosen by the seller, the buyers enter the 
finite subgame fer). Let ((J(r), (3(r)) be the sequential equilibrium in fer) which 
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gives the highest payoff for the seller. 5 We need to show that there is a strategy 
r* such that 
us (r*,u(r*),;3(r*)) = maxus (r,u(r),;3(r)) 
r 
where us (r,O"(r),;3(r)) is the payoff for the seller if he chooses the strategy rand 
the buyers play (o-{r), ;3(r)) in f(r). 
By Lemma 3.3 it is enough to show that the lhs achieves a maximum over simple 
strategies r. Further, as we argued before, we may assume that the price Ph,ih E 
[O,p+ 1] where p is such that no buyer is ever prepared to pay more than p for any 
mechanism. Note that all simple strategies have the same structure: a price for 
each h, ih, and a randomization over recommendations for each possible history 
that has been observed by the seller, where for all simple mechanisms, the history 
for the seller at a node x consists of whether or not the non-trivial mechanism 
was purchased at each information set on the path to x, and the recommendation 
made (everything else is captured by the seller's knowledge that he is at x). There 
are at each x a finite set of such possible histories. But then it is clear that the set 
of simple strategies available to the seller is compact (consisting of a finite price 
vector plus a finite set of maps from the fixed set of histories to randomizations 
over recommendations). It is also easily seen that the set of sequential equilibria 
of subgames is uhc in the profile chosen by the seller. The result follows. 0 
Note that in the discussion of Example 3.2, if one interprets message"A" as 
"choose up" and message "B" as "choose down" , then we are in the framework of 
this result. Note also that this example illustrates the need for more commitment 
under the endogenous case than under basic ex-ante pricing. It is key that the 
seller cannot lie about his randomization (which may be tougher to check than 
it is to see whether the seller misstated an exogenously generated signal). If he 
could lie, then he would be tempted to say "B" always when the top node is 
reached, destroying the equilibrium. 
4. Ex-post Pricing 
Under the two notions of ex-ante pricing we have considered, we have assumed 
that the seller has the ability to commit at the beginning of the game to a set 
of prices. In this section, we consider the situation in which the seller does not 
have this commitment power. Under ex-post pricing, the price of a mechanism 
is chosen at the moment that the corresponding information set is reached, and 
known only to the player at that information set. This price is allowed to depend 
on the node that has been reached. The set of mechanisms offered at every 
information set is fixed. A setting in which it would be natural for price not to 
depend on the node at the current information set would be if the seller and buyer 
agree on which mechanism is to be purchased, and only then the outcome of the 
5Such a sequential equilibrium (u(r), ,B(r» exists since the set of sequential equilibria in r(r) 
is compact and the seller's payoff depends continuously on the assessment. 
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mechanism is realized. So for example, first a home buyer and inspector agree on 
what will be checked, and only then is information gathered. In other settings, it 
is clearly more natural to assume that the information seller already knows the 
state of the world at the time that the information set is reached. 
At every information set controlled by buyer i let ih be the information state 
containing (a) prices for buyer i mechanisms chosen at earlier information sets, 
(b) mechanisms bought by him in the past and (c) signals observed by him in the 
past. A behavior strategy for the seller is to assign to every h, ih and every node 
x E ha randomization rh,ih (x) over a finite number of price vectors. Here, a price 
vector contains prices for all mechanisms offered at h. A behavior strategy for 
buyer i assigns to every h, ih controlled by i and every price vector Ph,ih chosen 
by rh,ih (a) a randomization over mechanisms offered at hand (b) a function 
assigning to every signal a randomization over actions at h. 
At a given information set h, the corresponding buyer is not informed about 
the prices offered to other buyers at previous information sets, the mechanisms 
bought there and the signals observed by these buyers. Hence, the space eh 
of states of the world among which the buyer at h can not distinguish contains 
quadruples (x, p, rn, s) where x is a node in h, p is a list of price vectors offered 
to other buyers at previous information sets, rn is a vector of mechanisms bought 
at these information sets and s is a vector of signals observed there. A belief 
system for buyer i assigns to every triple (h, ih,Ph,ih), where h is controlled by i, 
a randomization over eh. 
This difference between the degree of commitment involved in ex-ante and ex-post 
pricing can have major consequences for the revenues of the seller. To see this, 
consider the following examples. 
Examples 
Example 4.1. Inability to promise a low price hurts the seller. 
Consider the following extensive form game in which the seller offers the trivial 
and perfect mechanism at the second information set of player 1. 
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Player 1 is only willing to go down at the beginning if the seller charges at most 10 
for the perfect mechanism. However, once the second information set is reached, 
the perfect mechanism is worth 15 to player 1. With ex-ante pricing, the seller 
can commit to charge price 10 in a sequential equilibrium since the price is chosen 
before the actual game starts. Therefore, there exists a sequential equilibrium in 
which player 1 goes down at the beginning and pays price 10 for information. 
Since the seller can not expect more than 10, the information value with ex-ante 
pricing is equal to 10. 
With ex-post pricing, sequential rationality forces the seller to set the full price 15 
for the perfect mechanism since the price is chosen after reaching the information 
set. Knowing this, player 1 will avoid this information set by going up at the 
beginning. The information value with ex-post pricing is therefore equal to O. 
Example 4.2. Inability not to sell information in the future hurts the seller at 
the beginning. 
In the game below, trivial and perfect information is offered at both information 
sets of player 2. 
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The seller is interested in reaching the upper information set of player 2 since 
information is most valuable here. This can be done by committing not to sell 
information to player 2 at his lower information set. Player 2 will then choose up 
at his lower information set, making it unattractive to player 1 to play down. This 
enables the seller to reach player 2's upper information set where information can 
be sold at price 50. 
With ex-post pricing, sequential rationality forces the seller to sell information 
to player 2 at his lower information set at price 2.5. Knowing this, player 1 
strictly prefers to go down. Therefore, the seller can not expect more than 2.5 in 
a sequential equilibrium. So, the seller is hurt by his inability to commit not to 
sell information to player 2 at his lower information set. 
Example 4.3. Effect of the ability to reveal partial information for free before 
setting price. 
Up until now, in discussing ex-post pricing, we have assumed that the seller's only 
communication with the buyer is in setting prices. However, one could imagine 
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that the seller can convey part of his information before setting the price for the 
rest. For example, a credit reporting agency might send a letter to a potential 
customer which says "We have the information that a firm you own debt in has 
lost its AAA credit rating. Here is what it will cost you to get the details." To 
see the effect of this, consider the ff~lowing example. 
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Assume the seller can offer trivial and perfect information. It is easily seen that 
with no information, the buyer gets an expected payoff of 3, while with perfect 
information, he can earn 8 in expectation. Hence, in our standard ex-post set up, 
the seller can obtain 5 in a sequential equilibrium. 
Now suppose that the seller is allowed to reveal a part of the information before 
setting the price. In particular, suppose he can tell the buyer whether or not the 
play has reached one of the two upper nodes. Now, conditional on being at one of 
the two upper nodes, the buyer can get a payoff of 6 in expectation by choosing 
one of his two outer actions. With perfect information, he can earn 12. So, he 
will pay a further 6 for perfect information. Thus, if the game reaches one of 
the two upper nodes, it is optimal for the seller to tell player 1 that this is so. 
However, knowing the strategy of the seller, if player 1 is not told that he is at 
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the two upper nodes, then he will know that he is at one of the two lower nodes. 
In the latter case, player 1 is only willing to pay 2 for perfect information, since 
by choosing one of the two inside actions, he gets 2 without further information, 
while with perfect information he earns 4. Viewed from the beginning of the game, 
the overall payoff for the seller thus drops to .5· (6) + .5· (2) = 4. Therefore, the 
ability to reveal part of the information before setting price hurts the seller. 
Comparison of information values 
We have seen a number of examples in which revenues were higher with ex-
ante than with ex-post pricing. One might be tempted to conclude that ex-ante 
pricing is always at least as good as ex-post pricing. However, this is false for basic 
ex-ante pricing. In particular, ex-post pricing allows for two things that basic ex-
ante pricing does not: price can depend on the node that has been reached in the 
information set, and ex-post pricing may involve randomized pricing schemes.6 
Under ex-ante pricing with endogenous signal mechanisms, the seller does have 
this flexibility. Hence, the result does hold in that case. 
Theorem 4.1. The information value under ex-ante pricing with endogenous 
signal mechanisms is always greater than or equal to the information value with 
ex-post pricing. 
Proof. We prove the result by showing that every sequential eqUilibrium with 
ex-post pricing induces a payoff for the seller which is less or equal than the 
information value in the endogenous case. 
Now, let (r, (J, (3) be a sequential equilibrium of the ex-post case in which r = 
(rh, ih (x» is the behavior strategy of the seller, (J is the behavior strategy profile 
of the buyers and {3 is the belief system of the buyers. We transform r into 
a behavior strategy f of the ex-ante endogenous case. At every (h, ih, x) let 
P(h, ih, x) be the finite set of price vectors of the ex-post case over which rh,ih (x) 
randomizes and let P(h,ih) = UXEhP(h,ih,X). Let ihh,ih be the mechanism with 
signal space P( h, i h ) defined by 
for every node x E h and every p E P(h, ih). Here, ihh,ih (x)(P) is the probability 
that signal p will be sent by fflh,ih if node x is reached. Analogously, rh,ih (x)(p) 
is the probability that price vector p is chosen by rh,ih if node x is reached. Let 
p be the expected price that the buyer at h, ih pays if the seller chooses the 
randomization rh,ih over price vectors, beliefs at h are according to {3h,ih and 
the buyer acts according to (Jh,ih ' Let fh,i h be the simple strategy for the seller 
in the endogenous case putting at every h, ih and every node x E h probability 
6Under basic ex-ante pricing, randomizing over pricing schemes does not produce any effect 
since the pricing scheme is observed by all buyers before the game starts. 
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one on the menu with mechanism mh,ih and price p. Then, from the viewpoint 
of the buyers, f is equivalent to r. Therefore, (a, (3) can be transformed into a 
sequential equilibrium (0-,/3) of the subgame r(r) of the endogenous case. Since 
(0-, /3) in r(r) induces the same payoff to the seller as (r, a, (3) in the ex-post game 
it follows that the information value of the endogenous case is at least the payoff 
for the seller in (r,a,(3). 0 
Existence problem with ex-post pricing 
We suspect that the existence of sequential equilibria also holds with ex-post 
pricing, but have not been able to find a proof. With ex-ante pricing, each 
strategy the seller chose resulted in a subgame which was a finite extensive form 
game. We were then able to leverage an existence proof from the properties of the 
equilibrium correspondence of the subgame as the seller's strategy varied. With 
ex-post pricing, we can find no analogous construction. It is conceivable that 
the seller randomizes over many different prices at a given information set, and 
that buyers use the pricing at their information sets to make inferences about 
what might have happened at other information sets. Because of this, attempts 
to prove existence by approximation arguments have foundered on compactness 
issues. 
5. Unconstrained Pricing 
Thus far, we have assumed that the seller is constrained to deal with the buyers 
one by one. In our final model, we allow the information seller to set up com-
plicated interactions between the payments of one buyer and the prices faced by 
another. For simplicity, we assume here that we are in the basic ex-ante setting 
(as described in Subsection 3.1). That is, whatever interaction the seller designs 
to determine prices occurs before the beginning of the base game, and all players 
know the prices chosen when the base game begins.7 This ability to condition the 
prices faced by one player on the actions of the others benefits the seller because 
for instance, it could be beneficial for player 1 if the seller does not sell informa-
tion to player 2, and therefore player 1 is prepared to pay a price to the seller 
for charging player 2 a very high price, and therefore precluding player 2 from 
buying information. The basic ex-ante setting also implies that the mechanisms 
offered by the seller are fixed. 
As before, the seller cannot force buyers to buy information. So, whatever the 
form of the interaction, a buyer is assumed always to have the ability to choose 
to make no payments, and receive no information in the game. As we shall see 
however, the seller's power is enhanced here by the fact that he can condition 
7 One could also imagine a situation in which the result of the interaction between players is 
the choice of a mechanism of the form described in the section "Ex-ante pricing with endogenous 
signal mechanisms." We restrict ourselves to the basic ex-ante pricing setting for simplicity. 
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the prices charged (and therefore the information sold) to other players on this 
refusal. 
More precisely, before the actual game starts, the seller can set up an extensive 
form game (with finite or infinite action spaces) played by the buyers. Every 
terminal node maps to some pair (r,p), where r specifies for every buyer a price 
which has to be paid in advance to the seller and p is a price vector for the 
signal mechanisms in the actual game. This extensive form game is called the 
"pre-game". Since no buyer can be forced to make payments in advance, every 
buyer should have a strategy in the pre-game which guarantees him an payment 
vector r in which he does not have to pay anything to the seller. A strategy for 
the seller is thus to choose a pre-game having these properties. 
If a terminal node with payment vector r and price vector p is reached, every 
buyer pays his part in r and the buyers start playing the actual game in which 
mechanisms can be bought at prices p. 
The form of the pre-game could be very complicated, leading to both analytical 
intractability and a serious existence question. However, it turns out that a very 
simple pre-game yields the seller as much revenue as any possible more elaborate 
pregame meeting our conditions. 
Formally, the simple pre-game is defined as follows. The seller specifies for each 
buyer a price to be paid in advance to the seller. He also specifies which price 
vector for the mechanisms available to the seller will be chosen as a function 
of which buyers choose to pay the specified price in the pre-game. The buyers 
observe this specification and simultaneously decide whether or not to pay the 
price. All players observe the set of buyers who paid (and hence the price vector 
chosen) and then the game begins. As before, the trivial mechanism always has to 
be offered at price zero, regardless of what occurs in the pre-game. The subgame 
following a certain price vector is the same as the corresponding subgame of 
the basic ex-ante case following the same price vector. We term this setting 
unconstrained pricing. 
Example 5.1. Consider the following game, in which the seller offers the trivial 
and perfect mechanism to player 2. 
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If the seller sells information to player 2 with probability one, player 1 will go up, 
leaving the players with payoffs 5 and ° respectively. By not selling information to 
player 2, player 1 is forced to go down which leads to payoffs 10 and 5 respectively. 
Hence, both players gain 5 if the seller does not sell to player 2. The seller can 
exploit this by proposing a contract in which he commits to charge a very high 
price to player 2 (forcing player 2 not to buy), charges both players 5 for the 
contract and threatens to offer the perfect mechanism for free (forcing player 2 to 
buy) if one of the players does not pay. By doing this, the seller earns 10. Since 
player 1 can guarantee himself a payoff of at least 5 by choosing up, and player 2 
can do no worse than 0, it follows that the seller can never get more than 10 by 
unconstrained pricing. Hence the information value with unconstrained pricing 
is equal to 10. 
With basic ex-ante pricing, the information value is equal to ~. This payoff is 
attained by offering information at price 5, having player 2 randomize equally 
between buying and not buying and having player 1 go down. With ex-post 
pricing, the seller is forced to sell information to player 2 with probability one, 
and hence player 1 will choose up. Hence, the information value in this case is 
zero. 
Characterization of information value with unconstrained pricing 
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Before we prow t he existence of sequential equilibria and giye a characterization of 
the information \Cl.lue \\'ith unconstrained pricing, \Ye need some more definitions. 
For eyery price W'{'h.lr p for the mechanisms, let f(p) be the subgame \\'hich follows 
if the seller chooses the prices according to p. The set of sequential equilibria in 
qp) is denoted by SE\p).s For an assessment (a,{3) in [(p).let u,\p.cr. 3 be the 
corresponding expected payoff for buyer i (i = 1, .... ,n) and let Un-llp.cr. 31 be 
the expected income for the seller induced by p and (er, 3). By 
n+l 
U = sup max L Ui(P, a1.3) 
p (~,(3)ESE(P) i=l 
we denote the high~t sum of the payoffs (including the payoff of the seller' which 
could p05Sibly be achieyed in any sequential equilibrium of any subgame [lP). 
For ewry buyer i let 
Qi = inf min Ui (p, a, (3) 
p (~,(3)ESE(p) 
be the 10we5t payoff that i can get in any sequential equilibrium of any subgame 
[(p). 
Theorem 5.1. "-itb unconstrained pricing a sequential equilibriwn al"'ays ex-
ists. Tbe infonnarion ralue is equal to u - 2:r=l:Y.i and can be supported b.,- a 
simple pre-game 8.5 d~cribed above. 
Proof. First. we show that the supremum and the infimum in the definitions of 
il and Q.; are actually a maximum and a minimum. For every assessment l er . 3) 
of the subgame fipl. let 
n+l 
u(p,er,{3) = LUi(p,er,j3). 
i=l 
Let (pk. erk. 31.:) be a sequence such that (ak, j3k) is a sequential equilibrium in 
[(Pk) and 
'Ye may assume that the prices in pk are bounded and therefore, v.ithout loss of 
generality. p" converges to some price vector p*. Since the space of assessments 
is the same compact space for every subgame fCp) we may assume that (aX,3k ) 
com-erges to an assessment (a*,j3*). AB can be seen easily, (a*,,6*) is a sequential 
equilibrium in f(P-). Since U depends continuously on (p, er, j3) we have that 
(P* * ~*) l' (k k ~k ) -u ,a, JJ = k1m up, a , JJ = U, 
-+00 
.. As before. rep) is a finite extensi\"e form game. Therefore, the existence of sequential 
equilibria in flp) is guaranteed. !'ote also that SEep) does not depend on what payments 
where made in the pregame. since such payments affect all nodes in the subgame equally. 
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\,'hich implies that the supremum in the definition of u is a maximum obtaine<-l 
at a sequential equilibrium IJi" , 3") of the subgame [(p"), 
In the same way, 'W can sho\\" that the infimum in the definition of lii is a minimum 
obtained at a sequential equilibrium (a i ,3i ) of some subgame [(p'), 
::\ow. ,ye construct a sequential equilibrium \"ith a simple pre-game \,'hich giws 
the information seller an expected payoff equal to ii - I:7=lli;. 
The seller charges e"er:- bu:--er i the price 
that has to be paid in adnUlce and eyery buyer can choose \\"hether or not he 
wants to make this payment. If eyerybody pays his price. the seller chooses the 
price ,'ector p., If ewrybody. except buyer i, pays his price the price ,'ecror pi. 
as defined abm'e. is ch05en. In all other cases, the seller chooses some arbitrary 
price Yector. 
Let the strategies for the buyers be as follows. On the equilibrium path. all 
buyers pay their price in adyance. observe price "ector p* and play the sequential 
equilibrium (a"'. 3") in fly"'). If everybody pays his price except buyer i, the 
sequential equilibriwn {ai, 3/) in [(pi) is played. In all other cases, the buyers 
play an arbitrary sequential equilibrium in the corresponding subgame (as usual. 
double de"iatioIlS do not matter). 
The payoff for the seller is equal to 
n n L ri + Un-1 (P", a-. 3-) = L [Ui(P*, a*, 8*) - liiJ -7- Un ..,..1 (P*, a*, 3-) 
/=1 i=1 
n 
= ii - L~i' 
i=1 
In order to show that this is a sequential equilibrium, it suffices to show that 
the seller can neyer obtain a higher payoff by choosing some other (possibly non 
simple) pre-game. Suppose that the seller deviates to another pre-game. Then, 
each player always has the option of refusing to make any payments, and then 
entering a subgame where he earns at least ~i' And, the expected total payoff to 
players in any subgame is by definition at most U. SO, in any pregame, and for 
any play where the expected payment to the seller was higher than u - L~l.!!;-' 
at least one player must haye a strict incentive to de,iate. 
'Ye haye not only prm-ed that the strategies for the seller and buyers constitute 
a sequential equilibrium of the extended game, but the argument aboye also 
shows that the seller can neyer expect more than u - I:~l Yi in any sequential 
equilibrium, which implies that the information value is equal to it - L~l.!b. 
Furthermore, we haw shown that the seller can always reach this maximum 
payoff by setting up a simple pre-game. o 
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It is clear that the seller benefits from the possibility to condition prices of one 
player on actions taken by other players. The following result is therefore not 
surprising. 
Theorem 5.2. The information \-alue ,dth unconstrained pricing is at least as 
large as the information \"alue ,,-ith basic ex-ante pricing. 
Proof. In yiew of the theorem aboYe. it suffices to show that the information 
yalue with ex-ante pricing is less or equal than fL - L~l !1j. Consider an arbitrary 
sequential equilibrium with ex-ante pricing in which the seller chooses the price 
yector p and the buyers play a sequential equilibrium (a. 3) in the subgame f(P). 
The payoff for the seller is therefore equal to 
n-1 n n 
Un+1(p.a. 3) = L ui(p.a, 3) - L ui(p.a. 3) :S u - L!1;· 
i=l i=l i=l 
which completes the proof. o 
The analog to this would haye also held if we had worked in terms of ex-ante 
pricing with endogenous choice of signal mechanisms . 
.-! problem u'ith unconstrained pricing 
To ayoid openness problems. we needed to giYe the information seller the ability 
to specify the sequential equilibrium that followed any giYen choice of price Yector. 
This has the undesirable feature that it may allow the seller to extract money 
from the buyers eYen if he has no relevant information to sell. Consider. for 
instance, the follo"ing game given in normal form. 
EYen though the seller has no relevant information to offer, the information value 
"ith unconstrained pricing is equal to 4. This is due to the fact that both buyers 
are willing to pay 2 to the seller for playing (top, left) on the equilibrium path 
whereas (bottom, right) will be played off the equilibrium path. In such situations, 
the role of the seller is one of selecting equilibria rather than selling information, 
which makes the definition of the information value "ith unconstrained pricing 
less attracth-e in some cases_ 
6. Partially Informed Seller 
Up to this point we assumed that the seller always knows exactly which node 
of the extensh-e form game has been reached_ As a consequence, he could make 
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prices contingent on ewrything that has happened in the game so far. if the rules 
of the specific model would allow him to.9 In some situations. howewr. the seller 
may only be partially informed about ewnts in the game. Or the seller may not 
be completely aware of the payoffs receiwd by a player at the end of the game. 
creating uncertainty about the price this player is willing to pay for information. 
Our different settings can be extended directly to such situations by assuming 
that the seller's a-priori information in the base game is giwn by some partition 
of the non-terminal nodes. In each of the models considered in this paper. we 
should add the restriction that the seller's strategy is measurable with respect to 
this partition. 
An additional phenomenon which could occur here is that the buyers' purchase 
beha\ior may serye as a signaling de\ice to the seller. reYealing some information 
about the true state of the world in the base game. Think. for instance, of a 
repeated interaction between an information seller and a buyer. where the seller 
faces a-priori uncertainty about the buyer's type. The fact whether or not the 
buyer bought information at a specific price in the past may reveal information 
about his type. which can be used by the seller to set a better price in the future. 
In order to illustrate this learning effect. consider the follo'\\ing example. 
Example 6.1. At stages t = L 2 thit buyer faces the following decision problem. 
0.5 
0 
y 
0 
0.5 
Xt 
Figure 7 
Here, Xt denotes the payoff at stage t. "-e assume that the buyer can ha\'e two 
possible types: A and B, where Pr(A) = Pr (B) = 0.5. The payoffs for type A 
are given by Xl = 40 and X2 = 20, whereas the payoffs for type B are Xl = 10 
9Recall that the ex-ante model "'ith endogenous signal mechanisms allows the seller to make 
prices contingent on e\'erything he knows, whereas the basic ex-ante setting pre\,ents the seller 
to condition prices on e\'ents that where not obsen-able to the buyer he is going to sell to. 
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and .l'2 = 30 respectiwly. The seller is not informed about the buyer's type and 
offers the tri\'ial and perfect signal mechanism at both stages. If we assume that 
the seller and buyer are in the basic ex-ante setting. the seller's task consists in 
setting prices PI and P2 (one for each stage) for the perfect mechanism before 
the game starts. Here. the price P2 is allowed to depend on the buyer's purchase 
beha\'ior at stage 1. 
Suppose that the seller sets price 20 at the first stage. sets price 10 at the second 
stage if the buyer bought perfect information at the preyious stage and chooses 
price 15 otherwise. Let the buyer's beha\'ior be as follows. At stage 1. type A 
buys perfect information whereas type B does not. At stage 2. type A buys at 
price 10 and type B buys at price 15. 
In order to see that the buyer's behayior is optimal. it suffices to consider the 
buyer's incentiYes at stage 1. Type A is willing to pay price 20 for perfect infor-
mation at stage 1. since by not buying he would receiYe the same expected payoff 
at stage 1 but would face a higher price for perfect information (15 instead of 10) 
at stage 2. If type B would buy perfect information at stage 1. he would face a 
lower price (10 instead of 15) at stage 2, but at stage 1 he would receiw net payoff 
10 - 20 instead of 5. So, the loss at stage 1 by buying can not be compensated 
by the lower price at stage 2. 
The price at stage 1 can therefore be used as a screening de\ice to separate both 
types. and the seller benefits from this extra information at stage 2. The total 
expected profit for the seller is (0.5) ·20 + (0.5) . 10 -'- (0.5) . 15 = 22.5. 
If. on the other hand. the seller would ignore the purchase behayior at stage 1 
(meaning that he chooses the same price P2. independent of what happened at 
stage 1), he can not expect more than 20. In this case. he would set price 20 at 
stage 1 and (always) set price 10 at stage 2. ha\ing only type A buying at stage 
1 and both types buying at the second stage. It is therefore optimal for the seller 
to learn from the buyer's purchase beha\ior at stage 1. 
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